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Leo Strine's Third Way: Responding to Agency Capitalism

Ronald J. Gilson*
Ten years ago, Tony Blair's "New Labour" government sought an agenda that
replaced ideology with a pragmatic focus on both the creation of wealth and its
distribution. Not surprisingly, part of this effort involved proposals to bridge the gap
between capital and labor through refraining corporate governance. A "third way" as it
was then styled, would walk a fine line between privileging markets and allocational
efficiency at the cost of social justice on the one hand, and accepting less for everyone as
long as the distribution was fair on the other. Motivated by changes in how we save for
retirement that have made workers "forced capitalists," Vice Chancellor Leo Strine in
Common Sense and Common Ground offers his own third way: an approach to corporate
governance that reflects the dual status of worker-shareholders.
But more is needed than the shift in the position of workers from creditors under a
defined benefit plan to shareholders under a defined contribution plan, to prompt a
strategy for making corporate governance more worker friendly. After all, the U.S.
corporate governance system generally privileges shareholders. Whichever side may have
won the legal fight in the 1980s over the objective function of the corporation, as a
practical matter even the Business Roundtable has come to acknowledge that the
corporation's purpose is to maximize shareholder value. If workers are shareholders, their
interests will be protected just like those of other shareholders.
So, to set up the need for changes in corporate governance to address the needs of
forced capitalists, the Vice Chancellor needs to find a set of problems with the current
system that peculiarly disadvantages worker-shareholders. He identifies three.
First, workers are not entirely like other shareholders. They share with others an
interest in the appreciation of their stock, but they also have an interest in stable
employment. Workers' more complicated agenda, Vice Chancellor Strine argues,
requires that management focus on the long-term success of the corporation even if the
market applies too high a discount rate to future earnings and therefore renders myopic
profit maximizing based on the market's measures of the corporation's cost of capital.
Second, Vice Chancellor Strine believes that some major players in the capital
markets may not share workers' concern with the long-term value of the corporation. If
these players, exemplified by activist hedge funds, believe that current market value
undervalues the future, they will focus on short-term profits, not long-term value. Thus,
Vice Chancellor Strine's analysis requires a meaningful and observable difference
between a long-term and short-term strategy, taking into account that the parties to a
dispute over a corporation's existing strategy will derogatorily label each other's position.
Third, the very mutual funds in which workers invest must lend their support and
* Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School; Marc and Eva Stem Professor of
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their votes in order for the activist hedge funds to succeed. The claimed disregard of
mutual funds for some of their investors' interests raises issues of agency costs with
respect to the behavior of financial intermediaries on whom workers rely for protection.
We live in a system of "agency capitalism," to borrow the title of a recent conference at
Stanford Law School. Shareholders are increasingly sandwiched between two different
sets of agency problems-those associated with corporate managers' potential to disregard
the interests of their shareholders, and those associated with the managers/owners of
financial intermediaries' potential to disregard the interests of their investors. 1
The roots of Vice Chancellor Strine's efforts, he tells us, are found in his own
background. He came to the chancery court not from corporate law practice, but from a
position as counsel and policy director for a Democratic governor who apparently shared
some of Tony Blair's impatience with ideology. Vice Chancellor Strine learned that
focusing on the parties' interests, rather than their rhetoric, identified deals that would
make both sides better off, although often at the cost of ideological inconsistency.
Common Sense and Common Groundholds out the potential for such a deal between
workers and corporate management. In Vice Chancellor Strine's analysis, both groups
share a stake in the long-run performance of the corporation, which is quite different than
what Vice Chancellor Strine views as the short term orientation of institutional investors
and is only inexactly measured by short-term movements in a corporation's stock price. 2
The framing of the familiar corporate governance debate over each new tool to make
managers more accountable to shareholders-for example, just say no campaigns, majority
voting for director elections, and shareholder adopted bylaws-typically puts management
and labor on opposite sides, and cloaks in ideology the pragmatic conclusion that both
share a common interest in allowing corporations to maximize long-term value. How
long a leash managers are given to achieve long-term value is the kind of rough judgment
that lends itself to pragmatic "political" compromise.
Vice Chancellor Strine's analysis leads him to a set of plausible reforms that share a
common theme: give corporate managers some limited protection from what Vice
Chancellor Strine sees as activist investors' demand for instant returns, but reduce the
barriers to shareholder action if management continues to perform worse or even
differently than shareholders expect. Management would give up staggered boards but be
allowed to retain a poison pill; 3 elections for directors would occur only every three

1. As we will see in Part II, the situation is really a little worse-in fact, there are actually three levels of
agency cost between the ultimate investor and the investment of funds in a corporation's business activities.
2. The phenomenon of an alliance between management and the labor representatives on a German
corporation's supervisory board because of co-determination has been one of the central criticisms of codetermination.
3. This returns the law roughly to where things stood immediately after City CapitalAssocs. v. Interco,
Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Del. 1988), the high water mark of shareholder influence over takeovers: the pill
could be used to conduct an auction, find an alternative, or persuade shareholders that management was right
about the long-term value of the firm. When this effort ended, however, the pill had to be pulled and the
shareholders allowed to decide whether to accept a hostile offer. In Vice Chancellor Strine's current proposal,
the decision would be made through a proxy contest rather than through a decision on whether to accept a
tender offer. While I prefer a market, as opposed to an electoral, safety valve, see Ronald J. Gilson & Alan
Schwartz, Sales and Elections as Methods for Transferring Corporate Control, THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN
LAW, July 2001, at 1, the increasing sophistication of institutional investors has reduced the importance of the
difference in techniques.
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years, but on these occasions the playing field between incumbents and challengers
would be significantly leveled; shareholders would be allowed to adopt binding bylaws,
including a bylaw that would require shareholders to approve executive pay; and, in a
4
variety of ways, institutions would be pushed toward longer time horizons.
For those who inhabit the middle ground in American corporate politics, the idea of
a third way has a powerful attraction. Do we really believe that all of the costs associated
with a reduction in well-paying jobs are fairly measured by the corporation's savings and
therefore the shareholders' gain? Ten years ago Bernard Black and I stressed that the
efficiency of an acquisition is measured not by the net abnormal returns experienced by
bidder and target shareholders, but rather by the net of the acquisition's impact on all
those who are affected by it. 5 Do we really believe that standard economic assessments of
the costs and benefits of global outsourcing fairly include the costs associated with the
loss of the positive externalities associated with long-term employment? Henry
Hansmann, in the pages of this Journal, recently noted that a country might well choose
the social (and therefore economic) benefits of stable jobs rather than "lower prices on
MP3 players," 6 putting aside for the moment whether the choice is any longer feasible. It
is in this gap between the social and stock market measure of corporate performance that
Vice Chancellor Strine finds the potential for a deal: labor and management versus pure
financial investors. On at least the positive level, Vice Chancellor Strine is in good
company. Mark Roe's pioneering demonstration that populist-motivated political deals
have repeatedly constrained the ability of U.S. capital markets to directly influence
7
corporate management is by now a respected theme in the academic literature.
The critical question, however, is at the normative level: Is there really a problem to
be solved? In my comment I will briefly address three subjects touched on in Vice
Chancellor Strine's interesting essay. Part I considers whether workers as forced
capitalists really have a different interest than other shareholders. This necessarily
addresses the coherence of the premise that underlies Vice Chancellor Strine's analysis: a
significant and readily observable difference between long-term and short-term

4. Among others, Vice Chancellor Strine suggests requiring activist investors to disclose their short
positions so shareholders can better understand what action by the corporation will make them money; to hold a
net long position for a specified period before being allowed to make a shareholder proposal or a books and
records request; and taxing more highly short term securities trades.
5. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUIsITIONs 610
(2d ed. 1995)
[E]ven positive net returns to both acquiring company and target company shareholders may reflect
only wealth transfers from corporate stakeholders, like employees, to shareholders. Thus, the
absolute magnitude of acquisition premia or the fact of positive net abnormal returns earned jointly
by acquirer and target shareholders bear no necessary relationship to the efficiency gains created
by takeovers if takeovers can also have a negative impact on non-shareholder groups.
Id.
This is the general view of economists. See Marco Becht et al., Corporate Governance and Control 8 (ECGI
Finance, Working Paper No. 02/2002, 2002) (stating that corporate governance structure is "efficient if it
generates the highest possible joint payoff for all the parties involved, shareholders, creditors, employees,
clients, tax authorities, and other third parties that may be affected by the corporation's actions"), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461.
6. Henry Hansmann, How Close is the End of History?, 31 J. CORP. L. 745, 747 (2006).
7.

MARK J.ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994).
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management. Part II takes up the question of agency capitalism, and in particular the role
of mutual funds in Vice Chancellor Strine's analysis. Finally, Part III briefly considers a
broader question: the nature of the global economy in which companies operate. Here my
concern is that in our current economic environment, and for the foreseeable future, the
concept of a long-term strategy may be at best a nostalgic indulgence and at worst a
destructive mirage. From this perspective, a governance structure that maximizes the
speed with which a corporation responds to economic change may be in everyone's
8
interest even at the cost of shortening the planning horizon.
I. THE SPECIAL INTERESTS OF WORKERS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LONG-TERM
AND SHORT-TERM MANAGEMENT

As Vice Chancellor Strine stresses, workers are increasingly shareholders, forced
into this status by a shift in the structure of retirement savings. The move from defined
benefit plans to defined contribution plans transforms workers from creditors of their
employer to investors in the overall economy. To understand Vice Chancellor Strine's
point, it helps to take a moment to explain this shift in a little more detail. For most of the
post-World War II period, employees of large companies saved for their retirement
through defined benefit plans. In this regime, a worker's wages consisted of two
elements: current pay and a promise of retirement benefits in an amount typically
specified as a percentage of average pre-retirement wages measured over a specified
period. The idea was that each year the company would put away the actuarially
determined amount that, after investment, would yield the funds necessary to make
retirement payments as they became due. In effect, the company took the investment risk
(retirement payments were not pegged to the performance of the company's investments),
and the employee took the credit risk (that the company would have the funds to make
the retirement payments).
The difficulties with the defined benefit system are by now familiar. Many
companies cheated. Either they simply did not make the payments necessary to fund their
pension plans on an actuarially sound basis (leading to large unfunded past service
costs), 9 or they assumed too high a return on investment in order to minimize the amount
they actually had to put aside. In both cases, either workers ended up with reduced
pensions or shareholders ended up bearing the shortfall.
Defined contribution plans, in contrast, shift the investment risk to the employees. In
such a plan, the company is obligated only to make an annual payment on behalf of an
employee, who then manages the investment of the funds contributed to his account. The
employee's retirement income then is a function of his investment acumen; the company
satisfies its obligation by making the annual payment. As I will discuss in Part II, this
seems an odd tradeoff. It does eliminate the potential for and the difficulty of evaluating
large unfunded past service costs, but achieves it through what seems a strange kind of
risk transfer-the safety of securing sufficient retirement income was shifted from a
sophisticated investor (the company) to an unsophisticated investor (the worker).
8. The reader will note that I will not take up the particular proposals the Vice Chancellor proffers.
Precisely because each warrants extended discussion, the best course is to leave their assessment to others.
9. This resulted in a vicious political fight, perhaps the first time accounting got the attention of
Congress, over whether the unfunded liability to workers had to be shown on a company's financial statement.
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Without more, forced worker stock investments do not seem to pose the governance
problems that concern Vice Chancellor Strine. Like any other diversified shareholder, the
employee would want to maximize the value of the stock he holds; all shareholders are
thus in the same boat. However, one can imagine, at least in theory, two kinds of
differences between workers and other shareholders, one which could be but is not
serious, and one which might be.
The potentially but not actually serious problem arises if the employee invests his
retirement contributions in his employer's stock. Then the employee's preference will be
to maximize a combination of the value of his stock and his ongoing investment, with
respect to neither of which the employee will be diversified. In that event, risk matters for
employee-shareholders: unlike risk neutral diversified shareholders, the employee will
not want the company to accept all positive net present value projects regardless of a
project's risk. A corporate governance system designed to maximize value for diversified
public shareholders would not well serve the employee-shareholder.
For present purposes, however, and despite the experience of Enron employees who
misguidedly invested their defined contributions in Enron stock, the problem is not
important unless the employee is investing in his employer's stock. This is plainly not the
problem that concerns Vice Chancellor Strine.
The second problem, which is what I think Vice Chancellor Strine has in mind,
requires a social conscience on the part of the worker. Even though an individual worker
with a diversified defined contribution plan will be best served if his portfolio companies
maximize the value of equity even at the risk of reduced employment by those companies
(because the employee likely does not work for any of his portfolio companies), the
employee may have some sense of solidarity with workers at those companies, and also
may recognize that if all workers made the same assessment, all workers, including
himself, would suffer (I recognize that this is the opposite of the free rider analysis
usually applied in this situation-that is why the solidarity is necessary). Then each worker
will prefer that all of their portfolio companies behave as if each actually was their own
employer. It is this preference that provides the common ground between managers and
workers on which Vice Chancellor Strine's corporate governance deal depends: both
managers and worker-shareholders will want to maximize something more complicated
than the value of equity, and activist and institutional investors will be single-mindedly
devoted to maximizing only equity value.
As will appear in Part III, I am skeptical about the ability to predictably differentiate
between corporations that have sensible long-term strategies that the market
misunderstands and so undervalues (those of concern to Vice Chancellor Strine), and a
company that is simply following a bad strategy however long its horizon. For this Part,
however, I will simply assume that management and workers may accord a lower
discount rate to corporate strategies than does the market, whether because of market
myopia or because management and workers are maximizing something different than
purely financial investors. Here I want only to question the feasibility of the Vice
Chancellor's deal.
Let me start with an anecdote. The Pennsylvania anti-takeover statute is by some
measure the most virulent of the state efforts to protect local employers from out-of-state
bidders. I had a personal, albeit ineffectual, experience during its consideration by the
Pennsylvania legislature. In my first (and only) experience as a lobbyist, I spent two days
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in Harrisburg trying to persuade legislators that the proposed statute would disadvantage
Pennsylvania companies. I also tried to explain to Democratic legislators that the
legislation in fact did not protect workers. Large layoffs result from changes in a
company's market; the proposed statute only protected against layoffs that acquirers
would make but that targets would not. Labor was left entirely exposed to being fired by
existing mangers. 10 Despite the eloquence of my presentation, most legislators I spoke
with politely waited until I was finished, and then explained that they were not voting
against any legislation jointly sponsored by the state Chamber of Commerce and the
AFL-CIO.
So there is the opportunity Vice Chancellor Strine has in mind. When labor and
management get together, they can usually accomplish what they want. Here I add only a
corollary: when labor and management get together in order to make corporate
governance more favorable to management, labor may not end up with the protection
Vice Chancellor Strine envisions.
I have a second pragmatic concern about prospective governance deals between
management and labor: who speaks for labor? The shareholder activism and litigation
Vice Chancellor Strine describes is necessarily undertaken by organized labor. I simply
raise the question whether organized labor, which represents an increasingly small
portion of the work force, fairly represents the non-union workforce that, among other
industries, is dominant in technology companies.
II. AGENCY

CAPITALISM

Vice Chancellor Strine stresses that institutional investors, particularly mutual funds,
hold their shares on behalf of their beneficiaries, and that these representative
arrangements also raise agency problems. Our corporate governance system therefore
may be fairly characterized as "agency capitalism," where two levels of agency
relationships separate the beneficial owners from the actual assets in which their funds
are invested: both the investment decisions concerning which companies to invest in, and
the investment decisions made by those companies in their actual business activities, are
made by agents. 1I I want to focus my brief remarks here on the mutual fund facet of the
agency capitalism phenomenon for two reasons. The first is simply that Vice Chancellor
Strine emphasizes this segment. The second is that I know something about it. The Vice
Chancellor was refreshingly candid about his background, and I want to meet that
standard. For some ten years I have been an independent director on the boards of a
number of the funds advised by a large mutual fund adviser, and have devoted significant
attention to the funds' voting policies. 12 While I cannot represent that my experience
10. In contrast, statutes like the Maine plant closing statute, which require severance pay to workers at a

closed plant regardless of who fired them, do not suffer from this defect.
11. In fact, there is yet a third level of agents: financial advisers who influence or actually make the
decision concerning the mutual funds in which an individual invests. As of 2004, approximately 80% of mutual
fund investors "hold fund shares purchased through professional financial advisors, including full-service

brokers, independent financial planners, insurance agents, bank or savings institution representatives, and
accountants." INV. CO. INST., 2005 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 33 (2005), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/2005-factbook.pdf. Only 14% of investors acquire all of their shares directly from the
fund company (and without the additional fees paid to an adviser). Id.

12. Vice Chancellor Strine rather harshly evaluates a range of professionals, including academics,
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generalizes, it is at least one data point.
As to the corporate governance elements that Vice Chancellor Strine considers-the
poison pill, staggered boards, executive compensation, shareholder proposals-voting
policy is set by the mutual fund board. In my case the boards are composed entirely of
independent directors, with the exception of the chief executive of the adviser, and have
an independent chair. 13 These policies, rather than the recommendations of advisory
services, dictate fund votes on governance issues. On investment related voting, such as
the approval of a merger like the contested Hewlett Packard-Compaq transaction, the
decision is made fund by fund by each portfolio manager, and different funds may vote
differently on the same transaction because of different holdings and different investment
strategies.
Are mutual funds short-term oriented in the sense Vice Chancellor Strine claims? I
think the short answer, at least for the good ones, is not if they can help it, but the extent
to which they can help it is complicated. Financial advisers evaluate the performance of
mutual funds, and mutual funds evaluate the performance of portfolio managers, and
portfolio managers evaluate the performance of portfolio companies and potential
portfolio companies. In each case, the evaluator must determine the period of time over
which to measure performance. Mutual funds that seek to outperform the market will not
always succeed; being smarter than the market only some of the time is a significant
accomplishment. Portfolio managers are subject to the same phenomenon. And there is
always the danger that a fund or a portfolio manager may be tempted to take on more
than the appropriate risk in order to game the performance standard. Indeed, one should
be as concerned about funds and portfolio managers who over-perform as those who
under-perform; both may signal inappropriate behavior.
My. point is simply that, absent significant market inefficiency in pricing stocks,
short term strategies by companies, portfolio managers, or mutual funds are not likely to
succeed. As a result, I remain skeptical of the familiar, but never documented assertion,
that the market is systematically myopic. Activist investors and hedge funds may
sometimes be wrong, but as with any investment decision, that is in the nature of the
game. Campaigns to force companies to pay more to shareholders may be wise when
management is badly investing its free cash flow, and may be harmful if the company has
better opportunities than otherwise available in the market. I am aware of no basis for a
conclusion that the strategies pursued by activist investors, private equity firms, or
institutional investors systematically get it wrong.
Finally, I wonder whether at least some of the governance initiatives Vice
Chancellor Strine offers really need a "third way" coalition for their adoption. For
journalists, independent directors, and financial intermediaries as being influenced by their personal interests in
pursuing their work. Inevitably, we all face self-interest in our work; it is the mark of a professional to
overcome it. Regrettably, every field presents too many examples of failure, but a danger also exists that
constant immersion in the reality of governance causes pragmatism to dissolve into cynicism, where no one's
motives or performance survive scrutiny. Judges also have been the victim of this phenomenon. See William L.
Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). Pragmatism is
harder than it looks; perhaps that is why there is so little of it.
13. Mutual funds disclose on their web sites in more or less detail their voting policies concerning
governance matters. See, e.g., Vanguard Personal Investors Homepage, http://flagship.vanguard.com/
VGApp/hnw/content/HomeWhyVanguard/AboutVanguardProxyVotingGuideinesContent.jsp
(last visited
Sept. 25, 2007).
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example, I do not recall a circumstance when a company came to one of the funds on
whose board I sit and inquired whether the fund would support a poison pill that was
"chewable"-that is, the shareholders would get to decide whether an acquisition should
go forward after the company had a reasonable period of time to secure a better bid or to
convince the shareholders that the company was worth more if it remained independent.
Perhaps companies underestimate the potential to persuade mutual funds to support such
a pill, or perhaps the Vice Chancellor's deal is not what management wants.
III. Is THERE A LONG RUN?
In the end, whether there remains a long run, in the sense of projects with so
extended a horizon that current investors and analysts cannot fairly evaluate it, is in part
an empirical question and in part a question of ideology. The empirical question is easy to
frame but not, I think, so easy to answer. Have ever more complete markets and ever
more rapidly evolving technology combined to so increase the pace of product market
change that the key to success is the corporation's capacity to quickly adapt to changes in
its market, not its capacity to stay the course in the face of a doubting capital market? If
this is the case, then the direction of corporate reform should be to more completely open
the corporation to the capital market, because the more quickly an external response to a
corporation's failure to respond internally to change is triggered, the more likely that the
corporation will survive and its workers will continue to have jobs. Anecdotes prove
nothing, but it is hard not to think of the U.S. automobile industry's decades long
hemorrhaging of market share and jobs while completely protected from capital market
pressure, save for a single run at Chrysler by the activist investor Kirk Kerkorian quite
14
late in the period.
And precisely because the empirical question is difficult to answer, much of the
battle is unavoidably fought on ideological grounds. Renier Kraakman and I recently
referred to the conflict as one between Burke and Schumpeter. 15 Referring to Martin
Lipton's career-long impassioned and effective defense of assuring management the
protection to manage in the long run, we said the following:
Where Burke celebrates the French monarchy, aristocracy, and clergy, as the
architects of France's prosperity, Lipton celebrates the moral and economic
leadership of America's CEOs, board members, and investment bankers.
Where Burke decries stock jobbers, speculators, and mobs, Lipton's targets are
raiders, speculators, and "ad hoc consortiums" of shareholders. And where
Burke rejects "popular election" as "the sole lawful source of authority," Lipton
rejects share-holder choice as the sole basis for deciding the outcome of hostile
tender offers. Even the short-term perspective and lack of attachment to
particular companies that Lipton sees as characteristic of raiders and
arbitrageurs resembles Burke's earlier critique of France's revolutionary
16
leaders.

14. Quite recently, Kerkorian also made an ultimately unsuccessful effort to influence GM.
15. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Takeovers in the Boardroom: Burke versus Schumpeter, 60
Bus. LAW. 1419 (2005).
16. Id. at 1423-24 (citations omitted) (citing EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN
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Schumpeter presents precisely the opposite understanding of the world.
For Schumpeter, the essence of capitalism is not the ordinary competition that
goes on within an existing industry structure- incremental changes in prices,
quality or products that leave the underlying marketplace unchanged. Rather,
economic progress comes from revolutionary changes that subvert the ancien
regime. As Schumpeter put it, "the problem that is usually being visualized is
structures, whereas the relevant problem is
how capitalism administers existing
17
how it creates and destroys them."'
The juxtaposition of Burke and Schumpeter brings us back to the concern that
motivates Vice Chancellor Strine's essay in the first place: the importance, both
economic and social, of providing workers stable and meaningful employment.
Schumpeter's "'perennial gale of creative destruction" ' 18 does not strike selectively; the
existing structures it destroys house workers.
And there, in the end, is my real misgiving about Vice Chancellor Strine's agenda: it
is concerned with the wrong kind of governance. Corporate governance is about the
efficient allocation of resources. Real governance, the field on which Leo Strine played
before joining the chancery court, is concerned with distribution, with politically
accountable officials spreading the costs of rapid economic change, what Jeffrey Gordon
has called "the transition costs of capitalism." 19 I fear that trying to protect labor through
corporate governance rather than real governance runs the dual risk of both increasing the
risk that corporations will not quickly adapt, and leaving workers without a safety net
when those corporations change too slowly to survive. To be sure, the Europeans have
treated the corporation as a social institution as well as an economic institution,
concerned about social justice between labor and capital, not just wealth creation. But it
requires no crystal ball to see that balance continuing to unravel. If a corporation is to be
less efficient (although more fair) than its competitors, then either trade barriers or
subsidies (now limited both by the WTO and the European Union) are necessary to
protect the corporation's continued survival. In this country, neither is a viable strategy
(at least outside the agricultural sector). In Europe, we can expect to see less of both. The
burden of addressing effectively the distributional effects of allocational efficiency will
have to come from the governance arena that Vice Chancellor Strine left, not the one that
has concerned him since joining the chancery court.

FRANCE (Frank M. Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1790)).
17. Id. at 1431 (footnotes omitted) (quoting JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 84 (3d ed. 1950)).

18. Id. (internal citations omitted).
19. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1519,
1523 (1997).

